# National Security and the International Security

## Hans-Georg Wieck
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### I. The International Security Situation of Today -
### The Fundamental Change of the Nature of Conflict in the 21st Century

1.) **National Security Doctrines** are adopted by Governments – such as the US or the Russian Governments, I am sure also in China, India, Pakistan and – last not least by the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. The North Atlantic Alliance is invoked as an important, as many say an indispensable Security Structure not only for the Trans-Atlantic space, but also for peace and security in other parts of the world. (Political Security Strategy adopted in March 1999 on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Alliance, and the Military Doctrine MC 400/2 on May 24, 2000.

2.) In one way or another these national doctrines or for that matter the North Atlantic and the European doctrines are related to the security structures created by the United Nations and its Charta in 1945. The Charta provides for a structure, primarily the Security Council and a specific role for the permanent members of that body. They are charged with the task to strengthen international security and to react to acts of aggression. Chapters VII and VIII envisage military and non-military sanctions. The principle of self-defence, as well as the sovereignty of members states are confirmed (Article 51); however self-defence is tied with the obligation to transfer the conflict immediately to the Security Council. Defying this obligation leads eventually to political isolation of the offender. The USA experienced an unprecedented decline of its international prestige as a result of the unilateral military offensive against Iraq, which is extremely costly in political terms.

In 1945, the **United Nations** recognized the existence and emergences of threats to peace not caused by the traditional ingredients of imperial ambitions and ensuing military conflict, namely military aggression for the sake of territorial or ideological reasons and military defence against such threats, but new and different conflict situations in the context of de-colonization, access to resources (water, energy, access to the blue sea) and social tension (migration). The United Nations therefore established a number of Specialized Agencies charged with tasks related to de-colonization, economic and social development in underdeveloped countries and banking facilities to help creating the infrastructures needed for the development of decent living conditions, efficient state structures (good governance) and sustainable development.(education, health, agriculture, industrialization, trade and commerce). Let me name the following UN Specialized Organisations: WHO, FAO, UNESCO, ILO, World Bank, IMF, UNDP, and WTO. This strategy culminated in the UN Summit of Rio in 1992 and the adoption of the agenda 2000. It integrated diverse programmes and concepts for saving - for the sake of the survival of mankind -"mother earth" from implosion (climate, ecology) and to ensure a life in dignity for all mankind, hope for the future for the young generation of today and for the generations yet to come. Transformation of the principles adopted constitutes a burdensome task – but without the sober assessment of the situation and a strategy to keep the world and mankind going we cannot live

3.) Today we do register a great number of UN mandated, partly UN lead stabilization programmes, which involve the use of armed forces for the sake of conflict prevention, post conflict rehabilitation and peacekeeping The Strategic Survey 2007 of the IISS, London, lists

16 UN managed Peace Support Operations, and 15 Non UN managed Peace Support Operations and about 30 or more operations of the two types conducted in the past.
Non–NATO-countries are the main provider of troops for UN Peace Support Operations – with the departure from this practice in the new composition of UNIFIL Libanon being the first example of a UN Mission mostly supported by EU forces – and also the Military support contingent for ensuring security during presidential elections in the Kongo (2006).

4.) It is therefore on good grounds that many observers of the international stage perceive **the notion of "security of a nation or a Union such as the EU" in a much broader sense** than it used to be the case. Such a broad perception of threats to the peace, which includes massive violation of human rights, social tension and international pressure or failed and fragile states leads to a whole set of policy choices. Guided by the principal interest of survival and adjustment of the social structures of a nation or the Union to a wide spectrum to changing international conditions, for instance the perspective of membership in the European Union opens the avenue for conflict resolution among competing forces on the national and the international stage. But also, without such a perspective of a brighter future, it appears evident, that use of force has to be embedded in a strategy of nation building one way or the other.

5.) **Military intervention if undertaken – internationally mandated or not – is but one element in a policy to cope with a threat. In any case military intervention has to be accompanied from the outset by concepts and policies for national reconciliation and reconstruction as integral parts of the intervention.** The UN, NATO, the USA and the European Union learned this lesson on the Balkans after the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation and the ensuing civil wars within and across the borders of the former federal states of Yugoslavia. The USA and their allies try – belatedly try to learn the lesson Iraq, but it may be too late.

6.) The **catastrophe of WW I** was not only the war as such – a war of competing imperial powers and a war of losses in human life of unheard dimension, but also a peace without reconciliation and perspective for peace except on the basis of permanent submission of the defeated nations. The Woodrow Wilson perception for peace failed altogether, because the European victorious countries imposed the conditions of peace not the USA that means the country that decided the war as a consequence of its military engagement in 1917. The conditions of Versailles distorted the real situation of political relevance of countries for peace in Europe. The conditions of Versailles sidestepped the political, economic and strategic problems that nations in Europe were bound to face, among others the emergence of a Soviet challenge to freedom in Europe.

7.) **Because of the emergence of the Soviet military and ideological threat to Europe as one of the main results of World War II,** which again was decided by the overwhelming power and strategic situation of invulnerability (until the emergence of a Soviet nuclear potential) of the United States, **reconciliation with and re-integration of the defeated nations into the community of nations became the driving force to bring about genuine peace in Europe, which still is the case based on the credibility of the North Atlantic Alliance and the gradual emergence of a European Union that gains in weight rapidly in economic and financial terms and will do so as an indispensable pillar of international order and peace making facility in a broad sense.** Eventually and to the extent feasible a concept will gain attractiveness - the inclusion of a democratic Russia, based on the rule of law and the respect for human rights. This aspect however is cast into doubt in these days – for a number of reasons, which need to be discussed.

8.) During the conflict with the Soviet Union – called the Cold War 1947–1990 – **NATO-countries adopted a two track strategy of military deterrence/defence on the one side and of détente on the other hand (CSCE process from 1975 onwards) thus offering the opponent a political and dignified way out of the confrontation, caused by his aggressive ideological and policy, which in the end he chose.** This strategy kept the alliance going and capable of withstanding Soviet political and psychological pressure and in the end allowed the Soviet Union accepting a political settlement without Soviet domination in Central Europe CSE November 1990 and Charta of Paris, November 1990 following unification of Germany in October 1990.

## II. Threats to Peace and Strategies to overcome them

1.) Let me address some of the doubts that exist today in Europe **about the use of military power in a pre-emptive or preventive mode to cope with severe threats to the peace.**
Military power is activated to cope with international terrorism, but victory is not around the corner. Can it be secured by use of military power – it seems only up to a degree. Something else – undefined – must be added to this strategy to cure mankind from this disease of religiously framed non-state belligerents or militant terrorists around the globe. May be we need a two track approach – as was successfully done in the East-West-conflict, which also was driven by ideology and arms with ideology playing the role of undermining free democratic and market oriented societies that maintain open borders and have to.

2.) **Military power is also threatened to another country and sometimes unleashed to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction not in principle but in case of such weaponry being controlled by hostile forces and groups or states for that matter–** but with questionable results. It appears that a military campaign – also when based on a UN mandate - could be initiated only in cooperation with the neighbouring countries also threatened by ABC weapons from the country in question. In the absence of such an alliance the military campaign will be interpreted as an attack on the countries and peoples of the region and you may face again a year- if decade long military campaign, which is perceived in some important parts of the world as driven by of the strife for regional or global domination.

3.) **It appears that the impact of actual use of military power depends very much on the circumstances under which it was brought about** – as a unilateral assessment of a threat, a unilateral decision of a government of a country that felt threatened as was the case in the event of the US led military intervention in Iraq in 2003 – or on the basis of a case presented to the United Nations and a mandate be adopted authorizing the use of appropriate force by member states under their command or under the command of the United Nations – as it was done after the Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1990 and after 9/11, 2001 in the case of the Taliban rulers in Afghanistan and the Al Qaida terrorist organisation lead by bin Laden

4.) It also appears that wars conducted without an international mandate are interpreted in general as **wars with a hidden agenda**, for instance to gain or ascertain national control over strategically important regions such as oil- and gas rich geographical regions or areas of importance for international shipping.

**Such wars set bad examples, in particular if conducted by the one world power in existence at this time.** Such wars reduce the credibility of the country in question to bring about balanced solutions to burning issues on the international stage, a credibility apparently

much needed also today in many parts of the world, among others in Europe when facing a new assertive Russia.

5.) **Unilateral pre-emptive military intervention sets a bad precedent for others to follow the bad example in similar situations.** It makes international stability more vulnerable and it represents pour judgement because it overrates the readiness of the population to be drawn into unjust, unauthorized wars without being threatened directly and to repeat bad samples of poor statesmanship, in particular if the military pre-emptive strike does not bring about the political results for which it was applied.

6.) **The Vietnam catastrophe occurred during the Cold War, but today's military pre-emptive intervention without a UN based mandate sets into motion concerns all over the world and reduces the credibility of the leadership potential of the USA.** A great responsibility lies in the hands of the next US President to straighten out these setbacks and to regain its international prestige and confidence. The decision to go to war against Iraq was guided – in my judgement – by a combination of crusader mentality, the overrating of the military factor, a wrong assessment of the internal situation in Iraq and a misjudgement about the reaction of the region and the world at large. A select Committee of the US Senate established by way of an extensive research project that the US Intelligence Community had warned the President of the many pitfalls of any military intervention in Iraq and the loss of international prestige in case of a unilateral military intervention.

7.) Furthermore it appears that international legitimacy and solidarity is required for Governments, for Public Diplomacy and international understanding to be ready to commit armed forces and to suffer in case of need losses of live and in any case to shoulder considerable financial burdens for the solution of a conflict by military means or the containment and rolling back of an opponent in a conflict situation.

In the past the saying was: rather dead than red! Today there is a saying that particular countries have to be considered as devils and therefore need to be defeated and if not done - for the sake of a compromise solution - you not only aggravate the situation but also send a wrong message to the actual and to potential offenders of international peace and you act in the disgraceful spirit of the European powers who settled on Hitler's terms the issue of German minorities in Czechoslovakia with Hitler in September 1938 thus paving the way for Hitler's aggression against the other countries in Europe and the holocaust. This simplified argument has been put forward many times to justify pre-emptive strike under other circumstances which seem to have similarity with the contagious situation in the fall of 1938 in Central Europe. But the Munich issue was more complicated than perceived of today in a simplified manner as a moral justification for pre-emptive strikes today.

**It is important to avoid seeing events that occur on the international stage in isolation.** Events of the past are stripped of their environment and then are being abused to legitimize a course of action for a crisis situation that is debated between promoters of contested strategies.

8.) **The Charta of the United Nations does not rule out the use of force in self defence, but the Charta imposes on the state that acts this way the obligation to report immediately to the Security Council and to accept the ruling of the Security Council.** But, in general, countries that decide to engage in military action on the basis of a national decision usually disregard United Nations ruling and rather be alleged of aggression

according to Chapter VII of the Charta. Therefore the cure for manipulated self-defence cannot be expected to happen within the framework of the United Nations.

9.) **Unilateral military action – we can say - constitutes a high risk decision, and a high risk policy, and the political cost may be very great, the loss in international prestige and trustworthiness, not to speak of the loss in alliance building and peace making capacity.** And success of the unilateral action and intervention is not ensured either.

It appears that unilateral military action cannot be considered a prudent way in the pursuit of national objectives for instance the disposal of a dictator in another country by military force and usually ignores common wisdom that favourable circumstances for a satisfactory solution of a problem cannot be brought about by force, but if done so may entail enormous cost that usually exceed the benefits one can derive at first sight from a solution brought about by military force without a UN mandate. The Yugoslav case in 2000 was different, because there was broad international understanding, even in Moscow, however Moscow tried to avoid casting its vote against Serbia together with the other countries in the UN Security Council.

10.) **I do want to emphasize these aspects because we live in a period of time of new acceptability of pre-emptive and preventive military intervention as well as for action not based on the law of the country or on international Agreements but justified as the right of the executive to act in breach of the law for the sake of the nation or the security of the nation. Carl Schmitt, the renowned German international lawyer in the thirties pleaded for this cause and provided legal arguments for unlawful actions of the Hitler regime on the national and the international stage. There are also a number of contemporary US Writers pleading the case in this way.** The US - one of the major promoters of human rights within all states and in international affairs – suspended the validity of human rights in the interest of national cause (Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, the application of torture, national legislation) and did great harm to its international prestige. The Bush Administration also divided public opinion and the community of internationalists within the USA.

11.) In my judgement torture, which is banned by International Convention is not a promising tool for gaining reliable information from prisoners under your control. Usually it is used to deter others from engaging in terrorist acts and to exercise revenge or punishment. This practice has done great harm to the international prestige of the USA

12.) **Indeed there is a legitimate role of the military in international politics and in all security strategies as a deterrent, as a force over the horizon and in actual defence against aggression, if the strategy pursued aims at securing freedom, wellbeing and international cooperation of the area under your jurisdiction – for instance the territory of the EU or of NATO for that matter – by way of international cooperation, international agreements and international security arrangements – from collective defence commitments to cooperative systems of international security (United Nations), conflict prevention, conflict resolution post conflict reconstruction and reconciliation and nation building- in order to cope with actual aggression or threats of various nature.**

13.) The role is an aggressive one, however, if a country seeks to impose its dominance or Weltanschauung – its perception of world order - upon the rest of the world – of course usually such a strategy is presented as a means to ensure peace and stability everywhere.

**Part of the success of a defensive strategy lies in the attractiveness of this strategy for the international network not dominated by one country but supported by the many, which confronts the actual or potential aggressor, also the terrorist with the effective solidarity of the international community** of a universal or a regional nature. **During the Cold War the Soviet Union could not achieve success in Europe because of the credibility of the Alliance solidarity in case of an attack a member state – large or small**. Today terrorists may exploit fissures within the transatlantic alliance. **Today the main supplier of gas and oil to Europe - Russia – may exploit the still existing deficiencies of the European Union to act in harmony and solidarity in case of undue pressure from Moscow on a member state and thus pave the way for Russian dominance in Europe in the energy market and beyond. No military matter is involved – but the credibility of the cohesiveness of an alliance, of a Union in facing the implications of potential dependence of Moscow that is not moving forward to a democratically run country but rather acts as an authoritarian system not allowing open and unimpeded debate on the best courses of action and strategy for the country.**

**The credibility of the Alliance and of the EU depends on its capacity to build and maintain internal solidarity. That is the most convincing "weapon" of all to ensure security in a broad sense and in individual cases of need.** Recently, confronted with undue pressure by Russia on Estonia, the European Union – finally – united behind Poland and Estonia, countries under heavy Russian pressure. From now on, Estonians and other neighbours of Russia can sleep well again since they are and will be supported in their legitimate positions by the European Union at large (EU-Russia-Summit on May 18 at Samara/Russia). Actually, Germany put its weight on the scale in favour of the European Solidarity first – and the cooperation with Russia second.

**III. Collective Security and Unilateral Security Strategies**

1.) **NATO invoked Article 5 of its Treaty after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2007, but the United States chose to act on its own – with a UN Mandate for the fight against Taliban and Al Qaida. The Afghanistan campaign should have been a NATO–campaign with United Nations Security authorization – but of course – no Iraq war was warranted because of the lack of evidence of weapons of mass destruction or direct ties with bin Laden.**
Nobody can tell us how a NATO conducted Afghanistan war - given the 2001 conflict situation - would have gone in the end – but I presume better than the situation the West, the region and the world at large is facing now in Iraq, in Afghanistan and in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

2**.) Somewhere in between the end of the Could War in 1990 and the decision of the US to go to war in Afghanistan without the Alliance in 2001 the significance of continued transatlantic solidarity and the procedures to ensure it got lost.**

From that moment onwards, the international security issues in the Near and Middle East appeared to be unsolvable – because the US political prestige collapsed, it was over-burdened by the two wars of which at least one cannot be won, and the other one – now turned into a NATO-Operation (ISAF) – faces great risks and so does the Afghanistan reconstruction programme of the UN and of the European Union so far as the outcome is concerned.

**3.) Bilateralism instead of multilateralism was also the avenue chosen by the United States in advancing its deployment in Europe of some components of the project envisaging an Antimissile defence system – as a defensive concept against anticipated Iranian missiles capable to reach Europe and may be the USA one day. In the past the Allies (NATO) discussed such issues and reached an agreement – a political agreement that was then the basis of national governments to host US missiles or not. But the cohesion of the Alliance was not a stake – at no time.**

4.) Reportedly, NATO lost a great deal of its support in the USA during the difficult decision making processes in the nineties during the air campaign against targets in Serbia in response to the Serbian aggressive military acts in Kosovo contrary to the Rambouillet agreement about the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. However let me remind you of the fact that as a result of the post-conflict activities of the UN and the European Union as well as of NATO in Serbia and in Kosovo a gradual stabilisation process of the region was set into motion – conflict ridden as it was and still is. It will lead towards membership in the Alliance and the European Union.

**This is in a nutshell the doctrine and strategy, which should be adopted – military action to the extent needed under the guiding principles for political solutions on a participatory or self-administrative basis and involving processes leading up to it.**

The US was on its own in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan - but it was, **and still is lacking a political alliance for the political solution acceptable to the regional neighbourhood and supported by it. Military campaigns have to be embedded into credible, feasible and internationally acceptable even supported strategies, in particular with the neighbouring countries.** May be it is unattainable. Then, you should not have started the campaign in the first instance or as truly multilateral operations on the basis of UN mandates.

**5.) Before concluding the assessment of the situation in the West let us look at other parts of the world:**

It is widely accepted that globalisation processes in economic, in social and in cultural terms should not lead to the assumption that globalisation has one country in the driver's seat. There are many forces at work:
Mankind and international organisations as well as individual countries react to crises and try to anticipate crises and to prevent them by international agreements. Some argue that it would be desirable to connect China and India and for that matter Brazil and a number of other regionally important countries with the Western system of government and crisis management. Among these countries, the scope for cooperation with Western countries is practically without limits, **however the space for political submission is nil.**
Interdependence is potentially dangerous – it may lead to confrontation, to catastrophe in case of significant disagreements on issues of an international order, such as adherence to internationally accepted constraints, political and psychological warfare, belligerent behaviour towards neighbours etc.

It was and is an American political doctrine to actively engage with other countries even in case of rivalry or misgivings. **Countries with a past that included submission to colonial Western countries are sensitive beyond description. Imponderables play important roles in public opinion, in public diplomacy and can hamper international cooperation let me say on international terrorism, seaborne piracy or environment issues.**

**To encourage regional cooperation and crisis management is good in itself. International presence to give credibility to international agreements and commitments is important. The formation of alliances can be helpful in case of acute aggressiveness of a nation, but otherwise would be divisive. The North Atlantic Alliance constitutes a community of values and interests. It cannot be the policeman of the world, but could contribute in case of need – under UN authorization to cope with critical developments provided that regional countries in peril cooperate on their own grounds – not under pressure.**

### IV. National Security of the United States and NATO

1.) **The North Atlantic Alliance – founded in Washington D.C. on April 4, 1949 – was the framework for the US guarantee of European member states facing the Soviet threat; it was to provide the security umbrella for US financial and economic engagement for the reconstruction of Europe (also offered to Central Europe, already under Soviet control), for the reconciliation with Germany and its membership in the Alliance, its re-integration into the international community and for the launching of the European Union in 1950.** The significance of this Alliance for the second half of the 20th century cannot be overstated. NATO constitutes the collective agreement for effective self defence according to Article 51 of the Charta of the United Nations. The Alliance – symbol of unity in purpose (democratic values and freedom of nations) – and of political cooperation an all matters of security and preparation war (Permanent Council with committees on political, military and economic questions; Integrated Command Structure with war plans, national commitment of for ready to go armed forces to accomplish specific tasks (earmarked for assignment) in case of war (casus foederis according to Article 5) was not only a military structure, but also the major western structure for consultation on international developments of concern for individual or all member states, in particular for the assessment of the Political and Military Threat deriving from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. It was the body to discuss and agree on the political and the military strategy, including the rules for use of nuclear weapons to confront and to engage the Soviet Union (deterrence, defence, and detente). It proved its political and military weight in a number of crises with the Soviet Union (Berlin 1953, Hungary 1956, Berlin 1961, Cuba 1962, Prague 1968, Warsaw 1979/90; Transition 1985-1990). It provided the framework for negotiations (SALT/START; INF, MBFR). It prepared and concluded with the Warsaw Pact the Treaty on the Ceilings for conventional forces in Europe (CSE) and its updated agreement (1999) – A CSE).

2.) **NATO survived a number of crises in transatlantic relations,** such as Suez 1956; Vietnam, controversial Berlin negotiations US-Soviet Union 19961/62. It managed to develop politically engaging negotiations with the Soviet Union on confidence building measures (CSCE process, Helsinki Final Act 1975).

3.) In light of this great historical contribution of the Alliance to a peaceful settlement of the East-West-conflict and confrontation in Europe, which lead to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet controlled Eastern European Economic Zone (COMECON) and to a lasting US commitment to support Europe's security, it was all but surprising that Central European countries and the Baltic states sought protection against Russian potential pressure and aggression by acceding to NATO and the EU. These countries pay particular tribute to the USA for their eventual liberalisation from Soviet domination, and although they also seek EU membership their confidence in the EU capacity to protect them against Russian pressure is, may be was not very strongly developed. **This is legitimate – up to a degree - because of the**

**absence of effective foreign policy and defence policy structures within the EU. That is in the process of being changed.**

4). **On the occasion of its 50th anniversary NATO adopted a New Political Security Strategy (March 24, 1999, Washington D.C.); in May 2000 the new Military Strategy MC 400/2 was adopted.**
5.) **The EU did not develop – contrary to earlier plans in the fifties – defence structures of their own (except for WEU control mechanism) – among others in order not to double NATO efforts and not to undermine the US commitment for the defence of Europe.** Also, France and Great Britain maintained and continue to maintain Nuclear forces which cannot be subordinated to European Structures. In addition, in particular Great Britain, although member of the EU does not support further integration and does not want a European Power to emerge on the international stage.

**With end of the Cold War – as a result of the euphoria over the state of the world after the demise of the Soviet threat and even the Soviet Union – forces were reduced and the question of any future role of NATO emerged. However, in particular the agonizing collapse of Yugoslavia as a Federation and the ensuing civil war like decline of stability and peace, and the efforts needed to absorb new members and to engage in constructive relations with Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union suggested to stick to the Alliance as an indispensable structure for the security relationship across the Atlantic, as a framework for developments in Europe and as a military structure for limited warfare on the Balkans.**

6.) The September 11, 2001 catastrophe in Washington and New York prompted the Alliance to invoke Article 5 for the first time in its existence to come to the assistance of the United States under the impact of the terrorists attack and uncertainty about follow-on attacks. **However, the United States, seeking UN authority for the war on international militant terrorism and on countries harbouring terrorists, opted for unilateral warfare – supported by the willing on a bilateral basis and declined to accept NATO as a framework for its international military planning and activities.**

7.) **This departure from the consultative and operational mechanism of the alliance, including the desire of the US to withdraw militarily from the Balkans weakened transatlantic security ties, pushed forward endeavours of countries within the EU to accelerate the development of Defence and Security capabilities and caused rifts within the EU and across the Atlantic with its culmination in the context of the US unilateral decision on the Iraq threat perception and the decision to go to War, which was not won yet politically and is unlikely to accomplish the objectives beyond the goal of deposing Saddam Hussein from power.**

8.) Also in the past, the United States was engaged – beyond the boundaries of the transatlantic space - around the world in multilateral and bilateral security treaties such as CENTO (Turkey, Iraq until 1958, Iran until 1979, Pakistan) and SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) and US-Japan. These alliances supplemented the NATO-Structure in defence against an offensive Soviet Union. However, growingly – after the demise of the Soviet Union - the US found it cumbersome to engage in time consuming political consultations how best to cope with the unstable situation on the Balkan. The US engaged in policies directed at strengthening bilateral arrangements, for instance in the event of the first Iraq war 1990/1991.

9.) The George W. Bush administration declined the NATO invocation of the casus foederis clause and led the campaigns on national ground, driven by the conviction that quick military victory would lead also to swift political reorganisation of the countries in question – Afghanistan and Iraq – on democratic terms, partly leaving it to the UN (Afghanistan), partly to the military commanders with no experience in post conflict nation and state building. **The reconstruction of the countries was hampered because of intense local warfare, terrorism and civil war.**

10**.) Instances of NATO involvement constitute the exception to the rule and let the slogan be shaped: The USA use NATO as a tool box. This metaphor reappeared after the announcements of bilateral agreements between the USA and Poland as well as the Czech Republic to host parts of the Anti-Missile system that is under development in the USA and should be directed against potential Iranian medium range and long range missiles, not yet in existence in operational terms.**

**These incident emphasizes the importance that needs to be attached to the New National Security of the USA adopted and promulgated by President Bush in September 2002.**
Before addresses this doctrine and its international implications – also the potential of fundamental disagreements with European NATO countries let us look at the development that NATO took between 1991 and 2006:

- On November 7-8, 1991 the NATO Summit adopts a New "Strategic Concept of the Alliance" (France agrees also – it had opposed the Strategy of flexible response) – drawing consequences from the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of a Soviet Military and Ideological Threat: the deployment of forces at the East West border line is abandoned. Rapid Reaction forces as well Allied Joint Command structures (CJTF) are envisaged in order to enable NATO to conduct operations outside NATO protected areas; the US guarantee for Europe continues to be valid, so does the mixture of conventional and nuclear forces. Based on a concept of "Partnership for Peace" joint programmes are developed with countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These forces are invited to take part in crisis management operations and exercises. Forces committed to NATO operations are reduced from 1,35 Mio to 1,05 Mio soldiers.
- In 1992 Defence Ministers reduce considerably the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe (80 % of short range weapons).
- On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Alliance the NATO Summit Washington (April 1999) a new strategic concept is adopted – after a series of heavy disputes about the commitment of forces also in cases of lacking UN Security authorization – as happened in the event of Serbian violation of the Rambouillet Agreement about Serbian military withdrawal from Kosovo. Disagreement prevails on the issue of NATO involvement - beyond the cases of defence of NATO Territory - in other areas of conflict – beyond the boundaries of Europe and North America. The new strategic concept is based on potential threats in the area adjacent to NATO territory (South Caucasus, Balkan region), but also in connection with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist actions and border crossing criminality. Only in exceptional cases will it be possible to commit military forces in conflict situation without a legitimizing UN mandate. European countries will be in a position to conduct operations without NATO authorization.
- In May 2000 the follow-up document of the military component of the Alliance is adopted as the new Military Strategy (MC 400/2).

**In the eyes of the German Government** the agreements reached in 1999/2000 provide the framework for the following major tasks of the Alliance:

Strengthening of the transatlantic links
Maintenance of operational military forces against the threats posed by international terrorisms, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
Support of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
Crisis management and conflict prevention
Partnership and dialog across the Atlantic and with Russia (partnership for Peace, Russia-NSATO-Council. Europe-Ukraine Commission, NSATO-Mediterranean Council)
Arms control, disarmament, nom-proliferation
Option for other European countries for accession o NATO

-   NATO Enlargement and NATO-Russia-Council

In order to stabilize the cooperation with Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union a **"NATO Cooperation Council"** is established in 1991 at a time of Russian public commitments with regard to its international role in the Near and in the Distant Neighbourhood– a development, which pushes Central European countries towards NATO and access to the structure. This is brought about in 1999 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) and a few yeas later with Rumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia joining the Alliance.

**The W.G. Bush "National Security Strategy of the United States" (September 2002)**
A certain estrangement had developed during the nineties between the USA and Europe – culminating in Kosovo war plans and the readiness of the USA to engagement in military intervention also without UN mandate and – as was and is the practice of the USA – outside NATO-territory. The events of September 11, 2001 prompted the review of strategic doctrines and brought about a far-reaching change with the adoption of the new strategic doctrine in September 2002 – a few months prior the fatal preventive and pre-emptive military intervention in Iraq in March 2003.

These are the main themes:

**The President emphasizes more than was done in preceding strategic doctrines the option of pre-emptive strikes in order to forestall an impeding enemy attack (Pearl Harbour effect). Preventive military action seems to be legitimized in US eyes in case of evidence for a military attack by opposing forces within a certain period of time. In terms of international law such preventive actions appears to be very questionable. The new doctrine emphasizes more than done in the past the need for preventive action.**

**The doctrine emphasizes the readiness to act unilaterally in order to protect US interests.**
**The strategy is to support global political leadership of the US, the continuation of technological supremacy, the doctrine of military dominance and its use to secure resources for the US economy, the support for free trade world wide at conditions favourable to the US and the resolution to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.**

In his message to the public in September 2002 the President engages the US in active support for the respect for human rights in all parts of the world and for a war on terrorists with all

mans available to the US such as improved internal security, law enforcements capabilities, secret intelligence operations and measures to interrupt the flow of financial resources to terrorists. Without identifying specific countries he engages the country in a fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in support of democratic transition processes in China and in Russia. He declares the readiness of the US to cooperate with the existing international structures such as the UN, WTO, OAS, NATO and "other well established Alliances" in the pursuit of the national security goals laid not in the doctrine. **The use of nuclear weapons is not excluded, neither in the case of an attack on the USA with non conventional weapons nor in connection with a preventive military action against rogue states or terrorist groups in case of the intention or accomplishment of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Mini-Nuclear weapons for such operations are under development. The doctrine emphasizes the need for an effective missile defence system.**

**Whether in reality the USA will be in a position to gain credibility with its claim to bring about on the basis of unilateral doctrines and decisions their dominance on a world wide scale, as described in the doctrine has to be put in doub**t – given the experience gained in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the declining readiness of other democracies not to speak of countries such as Russia and China with a doubtful record on matters of democracy. Will these powers submit to the US agenda?

**V. National Security and the European Union**

**Let us look at the European Strategic Doctrine**

1.) **The European Union with its 500 million inhabitants, 30 percent of World Gross National Product, 35 percent of world trade and with the EURO as rising star on the heaven of globally operating Currencies cannot afford to be – as it used to be - a dwarf on the stage so far as international security is concerned. In fact it contributed the balk of forces to the defence of Europe during the Cold war.**

2.) On June 18 2003, Javier Solana, the EU Representati**ve** in charge the Common European Foreign and Security Policy presented the draft for a European Security Strategy - less than twelve months after the new US Strategy was introduced. The two documents identify a number of threats common to them such as international terrorism, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of civil wars or failed states. But the way these threats should be dealt with differs very much indeed.

**Let us take a closer look at the European document which was adopted in the meantime by the European Council and which should be seen in connection with the agreement reached in December 2002 with NATO to ensure durable and effective cooperation, among others in the implementation of the enlargement of NATO and EU in order to bring about the reunited Europe with its own contribution towards security and stability. The two structures agreed**
- **That the EU would take over military operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.**
- **The two organisations would study possibilities of a European role in Bosnia and Herzegovina.**
- **In early 2003 the EU would take over from the UN the police operations in Bosnia from the UN.**
- **NATO and the EU also plan joint military exercises.**

**In short the European Union – even without the benefits of an integrated Foreign Policy advances step by step in the development of a common security and defence policy, which sometimes in the past was considered to be a threat to the US as a rival institution to NATO or the US role in Europe. However the EU shares the view that no country, even the United States with their huge military potential, would be in a position to bring about sustainable peace and development und would need partners, also critical partners.**

**The document says:**
**"Since the end of the cold war the United States are the dominant military actor on the world stage the potential of which is reached neither by any other country nor by any combination of countries. Nevertheless no country is in a position to solve the complex problems of our times single-handedly.**
**The document identifies unstable developments as a result of regional conflict – for instance the Kashmir issue or the situation in North Korea and even closet to Europe the problems in the Near and Middle East. The documents refers also to the economic and social problem areas As potential areas of conflict and refers to the fact that since 1990 more than 4 million civilian population died in war and more than 18 million people lost their homes or had to flee their homes. The area of failed states is particularly prune for conflict – as well as to potential conflict with a in the event of scarcity of energy resources.**

The paper discards the probability of major conflict but focuses on three potential threat areas:

Terrorism
Weapons of mass destruction and
Failed states.

Under such circumstances the EU will in view of the various potential conflict and tension areas

- contribute to political stability in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe, which includes the Mediterranean space, including the Israel/Palestinian issues, South Caucasus and the neighbourhood at the Eastern borders of the enlarged EU as well as on the Balkan
- support the impact of reliable multilateralism to cope with international tensions and to strengthen world order by way of international conventions and institutions such as NATO, OSCE, ASEAN and of course of the UN.
- The EU has to respond effectively to new and to traditional threats, for instance within the countries by strengthening internal security measures, and on the international stage in the area of non-proliferation (cooperation within the IAEO) and also by support for rehabilitation of failed states.

**The paper addresses the need for the EU not only perceiving their security within certain geographic boundaries but to accept that lines of defence will often be outside the immediate geographic regions. Great emphasis is to be put on conflict prevention and support for unstable regions before the outbreak of crises.**

**The strategy paper suggests improvements in order to be – as the EU -**

More **active** in the pursuit of strategic goals,
More **coherent** in matters of common foreign and security as well as defence policies, which would require also the integration of the European policies in another areas such as development cooperation, Trade and Environmental issues, into the framework of the overall security policy towards a country or a set of problems,
**More effective** in all its defence activities (planning, armaments, operations)

The paper underscores the need for increases of the defence budgets and more effective armaments cooperation, improved intelligence cooperation,
The paper emphasises the close transatlantic cooperation and envisage closer cooperation in security matters with Russia, Japan, China, India, and Canada

**The question is now, in what way has the EU institutionalized its Common Foreign Security and Defence Policies – with the objective of greater effectiveness – in light of the failure to established EU wide ratification of the "Constitution" Of course there still is some hope that the parts of the Constitutional draft dealing with these dimensions will be put into the treaty to be finalized in 2009. Indicators tell us that this is likely to happen**

3.) Looking back and not only recalling the efforts to bring about a European Army as the contribution to NATO – in the early fifties, later on such efforts have not been undertaken in a serious manner, however, the internal security of Europe was greatly improved as a result of the development of the Common Market, the European Community and eventually the European Union. The threat that was posed by the Soviet Union was responded to by the efforts of the US and its European Allies within NATO – sometimes supported with some special European programmes.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Union embarked on the enlargement to provide political stable and economically vibrant environment for the EU.

The efforts of the Union in the context of "Political Cooperation" (Politische Zusammenarbeit) (EPZ) and later on the "Common European Foreign and Security Policy" were not really addressing problems of international security and Defence – since that was handled in a formal sense by the WEU. Eventually WEU was merged with the EU. The war about Kosovo saw the total absence of European capabilities. 95 % of the ammunition and 85 % of the cruise missiles used were of US origin and US forces". USA did not want any longer to conduct the wars in Europe that should be looked after by the Europeans! This was a clear message from Washington!

4.) **Initiated in St. Malo (UK/Fr) UK gave up its opposition to any security and defence role of the EU. After the debacle of the Kosovo campaign with marginal European contribution) EU members agreed in Cologne and in Helsinki 1999 and eventual in Nizza (2000) on a phased build up of a Common European Security and Defence Policy, aiming at assuming policies of crisis prevention and crisis management on their own. – based on a perception of security in a broad spectrum including Civil and military components (the ideal perception, however not yet strong enough to be used in larger conflict situations). That means the civilian and military competent are not rivals for solution but complimentary in nature and need to be integrated into one operational plan**

This means something new is appearing on the international stage and not simply the return to military intervention policy.

**First phase**: internal integration (Westeuropa) **second phase**, integration of new members(after 1990), **third phase** common policies for third country conflict management – this in particular for adjacent areas, as indicated in the Solana paper of June 2003. US Bush sen. and Clinton encouraged development of European Security and Defence capabilities. (Petersburg Erklärung was suggesting creating military capabilities under the auspices of WEU; Role of EuroCorps with German, French, Belgium, Spain, Luxemburg. The Corps was in Operations in Bosnia, Kosovo)

This means Europe now enters the international stage as a crisis Management Actor (see essay Maurer, Switzerland):

**Since March 1, 2000 the Political and Security Policy Committee is operative. It exercises political control and strategic directives for operations for crisis management – in addition there is an advising Military Committee (Chiefs of Staff of participating countries) and a Military Staff, (planning for operations). –**

**These institutions – together with the 1999 created office of High Representative for GASP and Strategy planning and early Warning - have brought about partially a de-nationalization of the European Foreign Policy. – Now we note repercussions of European centred planning and consultation on national capitals.**

**The ESDP Committee at Ministerial level on May 14, 2007** adopted for instance on this routine meeting several decisions on military capabilities, on the European Defence Agency, on NATO-EU cooperation, on the EU Operational Centre, on the operational status of several battle groups, on the development of the EU, on the Rapid Response Concept and on Afghanistan., the Congo Mission, Bosnia/Herzogovina and on Dafur. That means: **The European Security and Defence Cooperation is moving ahead.**

**Forces available:**

**Quick reaction force** was established in December 1999; should be available 60 000 soldiers by 2003 within 60 days, that means 180 0000(one third in operation m one third preparing for operation, one third restitution after operation). Also in quick reaction force: 400 planes and 100 ships.

In November 2004 (that is implementation of Solana Strategy Paper) it was decided to organis**e quick reaction forces in form of 13 small and readily deployable battle groups – each with 1.500 personnel (ready by 2007)**
27 member states have 1, 8 million soldiers – that means Europe is not very effective – yet.

Defence budgets 160 Mrd $ - less than 50 % of US budget for defence

Operations:

Now EU responsible in Macedonia 2001-03
Now: SFOR Bosnia Herzogovina (12000 soldiers) under EU command

Important: December 2002 agreement NATO-EU.

Needed modernization of larger parts of 1,8 Mio EU soldiers

On November 2004 the conceptual framework was adopted on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) dimension of the fight against terror.

ARMAMENTS
    European Defence Agency – first proposed June Summit 2003 –
    To improve member states capabilities, f
    To facilitate armaments cooperation among members
    To strengthen competitiveness of European manufacturers and
    To foster research

    Solana Chair of EDA steering board EDA created in 2004
    Director UK Whitney – retired officer of UK MoD

**That means: Europe is gaining a Security and Defence Identity by developing and promoting these various bodies and procedures. This will have a guiding influence on the kind of Treaty that will be achieved by 2009 in order to generate also a European Political and Defence Power structure – in addition to its EURO and its status as a promoter of international order on the basis of treaties, agreements, conventions and non-military and military crisis management.**

In fact the Iraq crisis and the rift within Europe have thrown back the European process towards Security and Defence Identity considerably – eventually this crisis may be overcome with the new Treaty, among others a common Foreign Minister, a European Army – composed of contingents.

5.) **Now everything depends on consensus to be developed for a shortened EU Treaty (not constitution) which should not be put to referendum. The EU Summit on June 23, 2007 in Brussels established agreement on all key issues.**

**Impulses to be expected in favour of enabling the EU to actually act on the international stage: Foreign Policy, Security ands Defence Policy (European Contingent Army) with special Role Fr and GB in national control of Nuclear weapons, European Guarantees?) Supplementary Agreement needed NATO-EU – but only after election of new President.**

**The US will be a difficult partner because of its international policy goal of dominance. Therefore it is yet doubtful whether NATO will again resume the earlier task as consultative body for policy decisions and common strategy issues. May be there should be a US-EU Consultative Process on Transatlantic Relations including defence and Security.**

**VI. The Russian Strategic Concept**

1**.) Russia's role in the international security structure is undergoing important changes. The Soviet Union was a signatory power to the treaties on Intermediate Nuclear Missiles to be scrapped – in 1989. The Soviet Union was a signatory Power to the CSE Treaty on November 19, 1990 in Paris on the basis of which a new balance of conventional forces**

**and accompanying confidence building measures were adopted – a treaty that had to be amended because of the collapse of the Soviet Union.** The amended Treaty was signed on November 19, 1999 on the occasion of the OSCE Summit Conference held in Istanbul – since then because of Russian and Belarusian position  no Summit meeting of the OSCE participating countries has taken place. And Putin recently issued the warning of withdrawing from the CFE and some of his collaborators put the question whether not to withdraw from the IMF-agreement on intermediate missiles. Moscow talks publicly against the US plans to install in Poland and in Czech Republic components of an antimissile system aimed at not yet existing Iranian missiles of strategic or intermediate reach.
**Moscow had to react to the US Strategic Doctrine aiming at stabilising US dominance in the military and economic dimension on the international stage.**

2**.) Moscow wants to react to the detrimental changes of the strategic position of Russia in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enlargement of NATO and the EU up to the Russian borders, even including the Baltic states that are considered formerly integral parts of the earlier Russia and the Soviet Union, and with the perspective of including Ukraine into the so-called Western fold.**

3.) The new Russian assertiveness has **contributed to unity within the EU that now stands by Poland, Lithuania and Estonia each of them target of Russian political and ideological pressure. Russia's assertiveness runs counter efforts of the EU to establish mutually reliable and stable relations –** given historical ties and mutual interdependencies. Russia tries to avoid treaty obligations in this regard (Energy Charter) and also continues to hope for progress in its efforts to split up the European Union on security and energy issue and to alienate Europe and the USA.

4.) Russia is in the process of adjusted its military strategic doctrine as adopted in 2000, April 22, a strategy that was perceived as a rather defensive one. The revised doctrine reacts to the deteriorating strategic situation of the Russian Federation and to current general trends that lent support to the probability of new wars in critical areas of the world – albeit not in Europe. The new strategy will require additional armaments investment in strategic forces. The country can afford major armament procurement programmes, all the more since the country relies heavily on arms exports – as do the USA, Israel, France and others.
**The Russian leadership tries to bring about a stable state guided infrastructure – in administrative, economic, military and international terms. It is doubtful about the implications of liberal and democratic developments in Russia and about external influences that would be channelled through civil society and media channels as well as heavy foreign investments in sensitive areas (oil, gas, other minerals, heavy and sophisticated industries). Moscow pursues in many respects a policy of self-isolation ("wagenburg") and of aggressive state controlled international investments (energy). It is doubtful that Russia can rely for very long on the plentiful income from gas- and oil reserves. The industrialization of the country is falling behind – so does the renewal efforts for the infrastructure (education, health, transport).**

On the international stage, Russia seeks equal status with the strategic power of the US, it tries to dominate the relationship with Russia and keep the strategic options with China, India open. Some strategists dream of a EURASIA linkage (Russia, China, India). Others advocate the Shanghai Club strategic approach.

**The weak spot of today's Russia is the decline of free speech, free enterprise and democratic consciousness as well as lack of the pressure for the respect of human rights and the independence of the judiciary.**

## VII. The Asian Dimension

**India and China –** each of these two giant states in Asia - are reckoned with today – in economic terms, notably on the international energy markets and as major contributors to negative climate change ($CO_2$-production).

**The George W. Bush military doctrine warns any other contender for dominance in the world. The USA considers China as the most probable contender in this respect.** The Washington political elites expect a Chinese imperial policy to emerge in due course. Whether justified or not this perception plays mentally a considerable role in US thinking. – So does –it in a reverse sense in the mindsets of Chinese strategic planer: The US appears to be the most probable opponent to Chinese interests and goals on the international stage – whatever these goals may be.

**Japan and India – each one of them for their own reason – seek reliable assurances from Washington in case of an aggressive Chinese policy on the international stage or in bilateral terms.**

In economic terms, China and the USA are mutually dependent on each other today. Cheap imports from China keep the consumer prize level down in the USA; Chinese purchases of US bonds keep the US fiscal deficits manageable; the US market absorbs cheap Chinese consumer products and thus keeps going high growth rates of the Chinese economy.

The internationally oriented think tanks do not address yet the question of the implication of potential strategic cooperation or power rivalry between China and India – in Asia, on the international markets and on the world stage.

**Europe pursues a policy in favour of international order by way of negotiated agreements on the international stage expecting countries like China and India to seek international cooperation in order to be able to better concentrate on their efforts to transform their backward countries – with one third if not larger parts of their population living below the level of the existential minimum – into developed societies.**

Berlin, May 2007