

# National Security and the International Security

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July 2007

## Main Points

1.) **The perception of international and national security has undergone major changes in comparison with traditional conflicts of the past:** Next to states and governments including their ideological perceptions as potential sources of conflict we have to register non state players and operators as aggressors and sources of conflict, or at least as violators of national and international penal law. Massive violation of human rights and commitment of genocide as well as civil wars are considered threats to international and in some cases to national security.

2.) **The response to the potentially multi-faceted threats to international and national security leads to a broad spectrum of security strategies,** which include - from the very beginning - next to military means all sorts of non-military components for crisis management, conflict prevention, post conflict rehabilitation and state and nation building. It has become common wisdom that military means to eliminate the military component of a threat is but one of the steps needed to be taken on the basis of international law and – as a rule – on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution, but that the overwhelming concentration on military means and structures for post conflict rehabilitation is bound to end up as a missed opportunity and a failure if not a catastrophe. Conflict involving the use of force – by the violator of the law or as state or non state aggressor - is political in nature and requires a political response – from the beginning to the end, which may include a military component. Every phase of the conflict situations needs to be addressed and responded to within the framework of a comprehensive political strategy.

3.) **Nations and Alliances develop new security strategies** – the one adopted by the USA in 2002 emphasises very much the need for military means in order to protect US interests in view of emerging military potentials, non state threats such as terrorism and shortages of resources, the one of the European Union (2003) tries to establish the needed balance between military and non-military components for dealing with potential threats such as failing states, international terrorism and instabilities in the neighbourhood of the European Union and other international conflicts. It is felt – from outside – that this mixture of military and non military tools in response to potential conflicts was and is dictated by the lack of forces fit for overseas operations. That is not the case. But it used to be the case immediately after the end of the cold war.

As a result of analysis regarding the unfolding of a conflictual situation, of political, terrorist or military threats to internal and international security, governments and think tanks in Europe like to identify a sequence and a package of policies in order to achieve the objective and keep the collateral political damage limited and under control. Countries in Europe learned from their failures in the post Yugoslavia situation, so will the USA and Great Britain

hopefully learn from their failures in Iraq – related to the alleged existence of the threat and regarding the strategies and means for political and physical re-construction or re-habilitation.

**4.) Nations and Alliances have to develop positions regarding the role of the United Nations, of the advantages and disadvantages of unilateral and pre-emptive or preventive military interventions, on the impact and collateral political and psychological damage of intended violations of international law including the violation of the convention on prohibition of torture and the violation of internal penal code rules.**

The problems and fatal consequences created by the writings and teaching of Professor Carl Schmitt in the thirties on the legitimacy of unlawful policies under certain circumstances are ignored nowadays - to a very large degree, I am sorry to say. Framework conditions for international stability are put at risk. The decline of international prestige of a “leading country” as a collateral damage of questionable military operations and rules of engagement in the Iraqi conflict reduces the capability to ensure international support and the cooperation of third countries as well as Alliances. It reduces the credibility of public commitments to law and order and the rule of human rights. Such commitments and such a prestige are indispensable ingredients of international stability. Ignoring them constitutes an invitation to others to follow suit. This puts international security at risk.

**5.) The role of the North Atlantic Alliance was tantamount during the Cold War.** It was achieved on the basis of substantive consultations on the assessment and development of the threat, on the development - in close cooperation with the partners in the alliance - of a “Strategy for War and Peace regarding the Soviet Union”. These pillars of cooperation “produced” mutual confidence, credible reliance on each other; it produced political solidarity for the country under pressure (Cuba and Berlin crises) and – in the end – convinced the Soviet Union that it could not achieve its goals – neither by force, nor by intimidation or political undermining of European NATO member countries.

**Such an Alliance does not exist at this moment.** It would have been feasible and needed in response to the terrorist threat. In the end the Alliance responded effectively to the Serbian aggression in Kosovo.

The Alliance probably cannot and will not be helpful in the event of a determined unilateral pre-emptive strike against a virtual threat that is not a real one.

**The European Union gradually moves from an economic union to a political and also military union with a message, with a strategy that gradually gains weight in troublesome areas – because of its integrated politico-military approach to the conflict and the way the conflict at hand should be resolved and worked on afterwards.** The Brussels EU Summit of June 23, 2007 brought about consensus on the key elements of a new Treaty on the European Union that will make the European Union more capable of operating more effectively than feasible today. The success of the EURO and of the Visa Regime called Schengen-Regime are ample proof for the thesis that whenever the member states are capable of establishing a common policy it is bound to be effective and successful.

A forbearer for this thesis in the security field could be seen in success of the “EU Committee on Foreign and Security and Defence Policies” established after 2000 and now fully operational. It is - in reality - the European body where key and interested countries work out common policies on all international security issues on the agenda of the European Union or the world at large – from disarmament, to CFE, to the Dhafur crisis, the Balkans and the

Congo. It can dispose – in case of agreement – of force, a general staff and a political planning capacity.

**6.) Given the emerging role of the European Union in Europe, its vicinity and on the international stage it can be expected that the comprehensive all inclusive European strategy in response to disturbances of international peace and stability will gain internationally in significance and recognition.**

As of now, the USA, the Russian Federation or even China and India may have their doubts in this regard. In Europe there is growing confidence on the principles and the practicability of the comprehensive Security Concept as pursued by the European Union and its member states.

Berlin, July 2007